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EARTH REMOVAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
"Whoso diggeth a pit shall fall therein; and he that rolleth a stone, it 
will return upon him." Proverbs, XXVI, 27 
By Alexandra D. Dawson, Esquire* 
INTRODUCTION 
Communities all over the United States are becoming increas-
ingly disturbed by the effects of earth removal operations. One cen-
ter of controversy is the increased mining of sand and gravel depos-
its for commercial purposes. The escalating price of sand and gravel 
is turning one family operations into ten-ton truck businesses.] 
Massachusetts has a long history of legal action relating to earth 
removal, dating back at least to 1846 when the owner of a private 
beach in Chelsea challenged a statute imposing fines for the removal 
of stones, sand or gravel from beaches in the town. 2 The highest 
court in Massachusetts found the regulation reasonable in view of 
a history of storm damage to local towns resulting from the removal 
of natural embankments. 
Municipal regulation of earth removal, carried on for many years 
in Massachusetts under local zoning codes (so-called "Chapter 40A" 
regulation), 3 was specifically declared a constitutional exercise of 
the police power almost twenty years ago in the leading case of 
Town of Burlington u. Dunn. 4 In 1949, the state legislature further 
empowered municipalities to carryon such regulation by general 
(non-zoning) bylaws and ordinances ("Chapter 40" regulation5). 
The state of the law under such dual state and municipal regula-
tion may be of interest to environmentalists throughout the country 
for a number of reasons. The case law on the constitutional limits 
of regulation is of general application. Lessons may be learned from 
the liberal imputation of local regulatory power in a state which has 
tended to take a conservative view of the powers of town govern-
ment. Finally, the scope to be allowed an existing non-conforming 
use is a delicate issue in every locality. 
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In discussing these topics, this article will attempt to show how 
regulations traditionally intended to protect narrow economic val-
ues may be extended to satisfy environmental needs and to indicate 
how the courts are moving toward acceptance of such wider con-
cerns. 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL V ALVES 
Until recently, earth removal regulation was simply one of many 
forms of municipal regulation of industry. Massachusetts courts 
proved sympathetic to such control, since they considered the use 
"likely to produce conditions bordering upon a nuisance."6 From 
that viewpoint, the principal problem was to preserve property val-
ues in the neighborhood, without putting the gravelpit owner out of 
business: a typical compromise of strictly economic values. Rising 
fears and expectations for preservation of the natural environment, 
however, have added a new factor. Massachusetts citizens have not 
only begun to question the environmental devastation wrought by 
traditional large scale sand and gravel mining, but they have also 
come to see noise, vibrations, dust and increased runoff as forms of 
"pollution" against which they have a legal right to protection.7 
In addition, citizens are being educated to appreciate the value 
of certain earth deposits in their native location (quite aside from 
the environmental trauma consequent upon mining). For example, 
it appears that high quality, low-lying sand and gravel deposits 
constitute the best groundwater sources for the development of 
local water supplies. A hydrology textbook explains that uncom-
pacted sand and gravel constitute "non indurated sediments" with 
permeabilities much higher than those found in most other materi-
als. 8 Another text states: 
A rock formation or material which will yield significant quantities of 
water has been defined as an aquifer .... Probably 90% of all devel-
oped aquifers consist of unconsolidated rocks, chiefly gravel and sand.9 
This can be confirmed by studying the water basin maps prepared 
by the United States Geodetic Survey which show, for example, that 
virtually all of Cape Cod's water supply depends on such deposits. 
The United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation 
Service emphasizes in its runoff studies that such deposits serve as 
holding areas for rainfall, whereby, up to the point of saturation, 
ground water is conserved and flood dangers are lessened. 10 In other 
words, the more familiar evil of erosion, visible in untended gravel-
pits, is indicative of another environmental loss: the unproductive 
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escape of water. These excellent percolation qualities are also useful 
in preventing erosion, runoff and escape of sewage in sand and 
gravel deposits which are too hilly to constitute aquifers. The devel-
oper who first removes the deposit for sale as part of his site prepara-
tion (which as will be seen is permitted without regulation by some 
local laws) may in fact be damaging the septic carrying capacity of 
the site. 
II. EARTH REMOVAL IN NAVIGABLE WATERS 
Because the government has histori~ally recognized the special 
public interest in tidal areas and other navigable waters, excavation 
of any kind in rivers, tidewaters and beneath the sea is now regu-
lated in Massachusetts by a variety of governmental agencies. In all 
tidal waters, a permit is required from the Department of Natural 
Resources Mineral Resources Division. 11 In navigable waters gener-
ally, a license must be obtained from the federal government,12 as 
well as a permit from the state's Department of Public Works. 13 
These licensing requirements may, in turn, mean that the federal 
agency issuing the permit must file an environmental impact state-
ment under the National Environmental Policy Act l4 (NEPA) which 
requires that all federal agencies, before undertaking any activity 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, sub-
mit a detailed statement of its probable impact. State agencies may 
be similarly affected by the Massachusetts Environmental Policy 
Act (MEPA) which became effective in Massachusetts in July, 
1973. 15 Under regulations published at that time by the Secretary 
of Environmental Affairs, state agencies are required to file environ-
mental impact statements for any licensing activities significantly 
affecting the natural environment. Such a report should presumably 
cover not only the impact of the activity on the area mined, but also 
the effects of transportation and industrial use, e.g., for fill. I6 
The state and federal regulations set out above are in addition to 
permits required under local law. Local control does not stop at the 
shoreline: the municipal zoning power extends at least to low water 
mark,17 and perhaps as far as the municipal boundary, which ap-
pears to coincide with the marine boundary of the Commonwealth. IR 
III. EARTH REMOVAL REGULATION ON DRY LAND 
Unlike some other states l9 Massachusetts has not chosen to ex-
tend state regulation to earth removal operations in inland, dry land 
locations. Therefore, these operations are regulated, if at all, by 
municipal ordinances or bylaws authorized but not required by 
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"Chapter 40A" (the Zoning Enabling Act) or by "Chapter 40" of the 
General Laws.20 
If the earth removal takes place in a wetland area, some protec-
tion may be afforded by the state wetland protection laws. In a 
district protected by a state Wetlands Restriction, a permit is re-
quired from the Department of Natural Resources, Division of Con-
servation Services.21 If work is planned in a wetland not under such 
restriction, the "Hatch-Jones" dredge and fill law applies, and a 
hearing must be held before the local Conservation Commission.22 
For work to be done in an area zoned by the municipality as a flood 
plain district, a local permit will be also required, usually from the 
Board of Appeals.23 It should be noted that since NEPA and MEPA 
do not apply to municipal licensing activity (with one minor excep-
tion), no environmental impact report is required of a municipality 
issuing a wetlands or earth removal permit regardless of the scope 
of the activity. The wetlands laws, then, are not of major impor-
tance in earth removal regulation. 
Suppose a typical local situation: a large glacial esker in a "nice" 
suburb near enough to the metropolitan area to make commercial 
extraction profitable. The land is high and dry and is located in a 
modest residential district on the outskirts of town. 24 A small 
amount of land has been excavated from scattered pits by a one-
truck, family operation. Suddenly, a big sand and gravel operator 
buys up the whole hundred acre tract and proceeds to run one truck 
a minute in and out of the pit, down a residential street, starting at 
four a.m. every morning. Hypothesize, further, that the townspeople 
seek relief, for themselves and the environment, under the following 
circumstances: (a) the town has no permit system whatsoever for 
earth removal; (b) the town has a permit system, but the operator 
claims his expanded use is protected by the former owner's permit; 
(c) the town has a permit system under a ch. 40 bylaw, but the 
operator claims his work is exempt under such bylaw, as a site 
preparation for a plan approved by the planning board; (d) the town 
rushes out and passes a very stiff permit system, but the operator 
claims exemption as a previously existing, non-conforming use; (e) 
the town passes a bylaw prohibiting sand and gravel removal in any 
district throughout the town, and the operator attacks the bylaw as 
an unconstitutional infringement upon private property rights. 
What are the limits of municipal regulation under these conditions? 
IV. MUNICIPAL REGULATION UNDER MASSACHUSETTS LAW 
As stated in the introduction, the power of a municipality to 
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regulate or prohibit sand and gravel extraction springs from two 
separate sources: the general zoning power of Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws, ch. 40A and/or the "nuisance" regulatory police power 
of ch. 40, section 21(17). The community may, if it wishes, employ 
both. 25 
In the days before the ch. 40 enabling provision was passed, the 
need and purposes of the zoning regulation was set out in the leading 
case of Town of Burlington u. Dunn: 
The stripping of the top soil from a tract of land is not only likely to 
produce disagreeable dust and noise dUrIng the process, which may be 
prolonged, but, more important, after it is completed it leaves a desert 
area in which for a long period of time little or nothing will grow except 
weeds and brush. It permanently destroys the soil for agricultural use 
and commonly leaves the land almost valueless for any purpose. The 
effect of such an unsightly waste in a residential community can hardly 
be otherwise than permanently to depress values of other lands in the 
neighborhood and to render them less desirable for homes. If this process 
should be repeated upon tract after tract of suburban land the cumula-
tive effect might well become disastrous to certain localities. . . . All 
this concerns the public welfare in the constitutional sense. . . . Aes-
thetic considerations are in themselves entitled to some weight along 
with other considerations. 26 
It is clear from this opinion that the court was sensitive to envi-
ronmental disturbance but only insofar as it affected property val-
ues. All non-economic values were treated as "aesthetic" and were 
subordinated to the economic problems. 
After the passage of ch. 40, §21(17), the town of East Bridgewater 
adopted a local permit system which was upheld in an opinion 
which distinguished sand and gravel extraction from "some lawful, 
useful and generally harmless occupation" and described it as "use 
of land which, if not in itself a nuisance, has been shown by experi-
ence to be likely to produce conditions bordering upon a nuisance."27 
There are advantages and drawbacks to each of the two methods 
of regulation. A town may adopt, amend, or repeal a zoning bylaw 
only by a two thirds vote after a planning board hearing, under 
Mass. G.L. ch. 40A, §6. Under such a bylaw, the permit power must 
be put into the hands of the zoning board of appeals or the board of 
selectmen (ch. 40A, §4). Chapter 40 bylaws are adopted, amended 
or repealed by a simple majority vote, and the permit power may 
be given to a special soil board, or presumably, to the local 
Conservation Commission or anybody properly qualified to consider 
the issues. Chapter 40 bylaws contain two inherent limitations not 
found in ch. 40A bylaws. First, land in public use is exempt under 
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ch. 40, §21(17). In contrast, a municipality is generally subject to 
its zoning ordinances or bylaws. 2K Second, ch. 40 exempts all earth 
removal occasioned by requirements of a subdivision plan approved 
by the local planning board. Although this exemption may be 
limited to site preparation work absolutely required by the final 
contours on an approved and properly recorded subdivision plan, 
many municipalities prefer the regulation under ch. 40A where it is 
clear that there need be no exemption for site preparation work. 29 
However, most ch. 40A permit systems do in fact exempt site prepa-
ration work below a certain size, usually related to cellar hole plus 
driveway so as not to impose permit requirements for minor, routine 
construction jobs. From an environmental point of view, the ch. 40A 
regulation is preferable in this area. Planning boards in towns with 
ch. 40 regulations have found themselves confronted with what they 
suspected were "fake" subdivision plans: massive earth removal 
operations masquerading as "site preparation." In spite of such sus-
picions, however, planning boards must generally approve any plan 
conforming to its regulations because of the narrow wording of the 
Subdivision Control Law. 30 
To confuse the issue further, however, if a town chooses to rely 
entirely on its 40A zoning bylaws it will find that land shown on 
plans previously approved and recorded under the Subdivision Con-
trol Law is entirely exempt for three to seven years from any new 
zoning bylaw prohibiting earth remova1. 31 No such protection is 
given subdivisions against new bylaws adopted under ch. 40, 
§21 (17). Consequently, many localities employ a combination of ch. 
40 and chAOA regulatory laws. 
The most difficult distinction between ch. 40 and ch. 40A regula-
tions is the protection afforded to pre-existing non-conforming uses. 
Chapter 40A, §5, provides that a zoning bylaw: 
shall not apply . . . to the existing use . . . of land to the extent to 
which it is used at the time of the adoption of the ... bylaw, but it 
shall apply to any change of use . . . . 
Section 5 further provides that a local bylaw "may regulate non-use 
of non-conforming buildings and structures so as not to unduly pro-
long the life of non-conforming uses." Presumably in reliance upon 
this language, it has been held that a non-conforming use of land 
may be lost by abandonment or non-use.32 Between the extremes of 
radical expansion and complete abandonment, a whole body of law 
which will be discussed below has grown up regarding protection of 
non-conforming uses under the zoning laws. 
The recent case of Kelleher v. Board of Selectmen of Pembroke33 
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concerned the scope of a ch. 40 earth removal bylaw, the substance 
of which is discussed below. On the issue of prospective application 
of this nonzoning bylaw, the brief for the Town of Pembroke argued 
that the bylaw, being penal, was prospectively applicable even to 
pre-existing operations.:l4 The court did not deal with this argument 
but simply pointed out that reasonable regulation (as opposed to 
prohibition of use) under ch. 40A zoning bylaw has been applied to 
pre-existing uses.:l5 By analogy, the court applied the new permit 
system of Pembroke to the work in progress. The court did, however, 
exempt land excavated before the permit system went into effect 
from requirements of loaming or reseeding: 
. . . to condition the grant of a permit upon the restoration of the area 
already cleared and stripped would be retroactively to penalize the 
plaintiff for acts which were lawful when done.:l6 
It appears, therefore, that general constitutional principles afford 
non-conforming uses the same protection under ch. 40 bylaws as is 
afforded by the statute governing zoning bylaws. 
Under neither ch. 40 nor ch.40A has the police power been explic-
itly interpreted as including environmental values as such. The lan-
guage of recent cases, however, shows a shift of emphasis from pro-
tection of individual property values to preservation of community 
values, and thence toward the view of man as part of his total 
environmental setting. In the leading wetlands protection case of 
Turnpike Realty Co. Inc. v. Town of Dedham the court specifically 
approved the following purposes of the Dedham flood plain bylaw: 
protection of persons and properties against flooding; "protection of 
the entire community from individual choices of land use which 
require subsequent public expenditures ... "; and conservation of 
natural conditions, wildlife, and open spaces (as ancillary to other 
purposes).:17 Wisconsin, in Just v. Marinette County, went even fur-
ther to support the conclusion that alteration of a swamp need not 
be permitted where it could damage public rights. A gradual shift 
from public costs to environmental values is evident in the following 
passage from the court's opinion: 
We start with the premise that lakes and rivers in their natural state 
are unpolluted and the pollution which now exists is man made. The 
state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to eradicate the 
present pollution and to prevent further pollution in its navigable wa-
ters. This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a securing of a benefit by the 
maintaining of the natural status quo of the environment. What makes 
this case different from most condemnation or police power zoning cases 
is the interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural 
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environment of shore lands to the purity of the water and to such natural 
resources as navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty. Swamps and wet-
lands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, and not pictur-
esque. But as the people became more sophisticated, an appreciation 
was acquired that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are 
part of the balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water 
in our lakes and streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of 
the ecological creation and now, even to the uninitiated, possess their 
own beauty in nature. An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited 
right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it 
for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which 
injures the rights of others.:lx 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF REGULATION 
At least eight Massachusetts towns, not satisfied with merely 
regulating earth removal, have passed bylaws or zoning laws prohib-
iting any earth removal activities except those absolutely necessary 
for the preparation of a building site. For an owner of land contain-
ing a commercially valuable deposit of sand or gravel this approach 
raises the question of whether he is being deprived without compen-
sation of valuable property rights in violation of the state and fed-
eral constitutions. 
The Massachusetts court addressed itself to this issue in Town of 
Burlington v. Dunn: 
It seems unlikely that the defendants' property rights will be any more 
seriously restricted or damaged by enforcement of this by-law than are 
the property rights of thousands of landowners by zoning ordinances or 
by-laws which forbid the erection or use of buildings in residence dis-
tricts for other than residence purposes. . . . 
In our opinion the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, cited by the defendants, decided upon peculiar facts by a divided 
court before the decisions of the same court in which the validity of 
zoning regulations was established, it is not decisive here. It has been 
recognized in a number of the later cases that the validity of zoning 
ordinances in their application to particular land where, if valid, they 
would have the effect of preventing the removal of some natural product 
from the land, is to be determined with reference to their reasonableness 
under the circumstances just as in cases where the limitation upon the 
owner's rights has to do with buildings and their uses.:m 
In Town of Lexington v. Simeone, it was stated "there is no con-
stitutional right to convert wild land into waste land."10 The court 
noted that a zoning bylaw is presumed to be valid and will be 
sustained unless it bears no substantial relation to the statutory 
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objectives. 41 In Seekonk v. John J. McHale & Sons, Inc., the court 
stated bluntly: 
There seems to us to be no difference in principle whether the restriction 
takes the form of preventing the owner from building a factory or from 
establishing a travel businessY 
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to share these views. In 
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, the Court upheld a local ordinance, regu-
lating depth of excavation, which had the effect of preventing any 
further mining on the plaintiff's land: 
Concededly the ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which 
the property has previously been devoted. However, such a characteriza-
tion does not tell us whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutionalY 
The court found it insignificant that the use was of the soil itself, 
and not a use upon the soil. Evidence as to diminution of value was 
found insufficient. The Court also emphasized the general presump-
tion of reasonableness which supports police power regulation. 44 
This presumption would tend to sustain Massachusetts ch. 40 by-
laws, as well as zoning bylaws. 
In Consolidated Rock Products Company v. City of Los Angeles, 
the California Supreme Court upheld a local zoning law forbidding 
rock and gravel mining in agricultural and residential districts, de-
spite contentions that plaintiff's property had no other economic 
use: 
Too many cases have been decided upholding the constitutionality of 
comprehensive zoning ordinances prohibiting the removal of natural 
products in certain zones for us now to accept at full value the sugges-
tion that there is such an inherent difference in natural products of the 
property. . . .45 
Other state courts have, however, arrived at a variety of conclu-
sions and will no doubt continue to do so, since all cases in the 
"taking" area are susceptible to being distinguished on their partic-
ular facts. 46 Of particular interest are: Troiano v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of Town of North Branford,47 following Goldblatt; the con-
trasting Illinois cases of Midland Electric Co. Corp. v. Knox 
County,48 and Village of Spillerton v. Prewitt;49 two equally con-
trasting cases from Ohio; East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth,50 and 
Smith v. Juillerat51 ; and Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor 
of Maryland52 where a state law prohibiting gravel extraction from 
tidal lands was held not to be a "taking" requiring compensation. 
The contrary position is summed up in Lyon Sand & Gravel v. 
Township of Oakland: 
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Where needed natural resources are known to exist in usable quantity, 
their utilization should be permitted in a manner compatible with the 
present use of adjacent lands. The taking should not interfere with the 
reasonable use of neighboring properties but outright prohibition of the 
taking is in fact confiscation rather than conservation.53 
There is some force in the argument that mining is not a "porta-
ble" activity and that natural resources should not be locked away 
from reasonable use simply because neighboring land has been de-
voted to incompatible residential use. The dilemma illustrates the 
lack of relationship between our land use law and rational allocation 
of natural resources. Valuable farmland is zoned commercial and 
covered with asphalt; dangerous floodplains are made available for 
residential development; the potential of rivers for the production 
of either power or aesthetic pleasure is seldom reflected in local 
zoning. It may well be that if sound economic resource use is not 
now part of the constitutionality, or even the legality, of municipal 
zoning then it ought to be, particularly as planners become more 
sophisticated and resources more scarce. On the other hand, in that 
same sophisticated future the ecological value of local sand and 
gravel deposits, and the environmental disruption involved in their 
removal, should also be accorded increasing weight. In the interim, 
municipalities are surely justified in reserving their judgment-and 
their grave1.54 
VI. ELEMENTS OF A VALID ORDINANCE OR BYLAW 
In framing a Massachusetts earth removal bylaw or ordinance, it 
is important to relate it to the statutory purposes of ch. 40A and ch. 
40. The traditional general health, safety and property value bases 
of the police power, set out in Town of Burlington u. Dunn, were 
somewhat expanded in Town of Stow u. Marinelli: 
We have said that the purpose of this enabling statute (Ch. 40) 'was to 
regulate the stripping of topsoil so as to prevent the injurious effects 
brought about by the creation of waste areas.' Butler v. East Bridgewa-
ter, 330 Mass. 33, 36. Undoubtedly, there are other purposes which may 
properly be accomplished under this statute: for instance, the regulation 
of noise, dust or other effects which are peculiarly related to earth re-
moval operations and detrimental to the public welfare.55 
Case history shows that the word "detrimental" originally referred 
to detriment to property values and, secondarily, to human health. 
However, the concept of detriment is undergoing expansion. Noise 
and dust56 are now seen as types of "pollution" affecting more than 
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merely economic values. Similarly, if grading and reseeding require-
ments were once upheld because they protected neighborhood prop-
erty values, they may now be enforced in order to prevent erosion 
which damages the earth itself. In light of Turnpike Realty the 
statutory purposes may one day be held to comprehend flood pre-
vention and preservation of local water supply if these can be shown 
to be linked with earth removal. 
In the case of Kelleher u. Board of Selectmen of Pembroke, dis-
cussed above, the Massachusetts Appeals Court approved a ch. 40 
bylaw enabling the selectmen of Pembroke to impose a variety of 
conditions upon earth removal permits: applicants were required to 
produce a viable plan for reloaming and for control of temporary 
drainage; water courses and wet areas were to be delineated on 
plans; and a 200 foot buffer area could be imposed along public 
ways. The plaintiff's activities had included damage to a local brook 
and in refusing the permit the selectmen complained, inter alia, of 
"lack of sufficient data to insure that Pudding Brook, its vegetation 
and wildlife, would not be adversely affected by silting and surface 
runoff. "57 
The attitude of the Appeals Court toward these requirements can 
be measured by its comment that aerial photographs of the site 
portrayed "a wasteland in the making."58 The court found the re-
quirements reasonable because without such controls the operation 
would "necessarily result in depreciation of neighboring properties 
and substantial interference with neighboring residents in the nor-
mal use and enjoyment of their properties."59 A careful reading of 
this case will reveal that the inevitable invocation of property values 
should be balanced by considerations of water pollution, erosion, 
and damage to the land. RO 
A model earth removal bylaw, proposed by the Middlesex County 
Conservation District in December, 1969, refers to "growing general 
public concern over the use of our natural resources and the mainte-
nance of our human environment."RI The proposal imposes the fol-
lowing health conditions: 
(g) No gravel shall be removed closer to spring high water table that 
(sic) would preclude its subsequent reuse according to existing public 
health standards .... 
(1) No area shall be excavated so as to cause the accumulation of free 
standing water. Permanent drainage shall be provided as needed in 
accordance with good conservation practices. 
Section (m) of the model bylaw adopts an environmentally oriented 
approach to the protection of water resources and requires that "no 
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excavation shall be allowed closer than 50 feet from a natural 
stream." As more is learned of the part played by sand and gravel 
deposits in purifying water supply and aiding aquifer recharge, the 
regulatory power will support further protection of local water sup-
plies. 
In addition to the health, safety, property value and environmen-
tal considerations now approved for a permit system, "aesthetic" 
regulations are justifiable as auxiliary to the exercise of the police 
power.62 Environmentalists should study carefully all "aesthetic" 
regulations on land use, to distinguish those which are cosmetic 
from those which mirror growing perception of environmental val-
ues. 
An interesting clarification was made in a recent case63 of the 
apparent limitation set forth in Town of Stow v. Marinelli64 that, 
under earth removal bylaws of any kind, no permit can be denied 
on the likelihood that truck traffic will create a local traffic hazard 
on public streets. The question, as the court in Stow saw it, was one 
of discrimination: 
. . . there is nothing to indicate that trucks of equal size would not 
create the same traffic difficulties, regardless of whether they were laden 
with sand and gravel or with anything else. In effect, then, Stow is 
attempting to enforce a traffic regulation aimed solely at sand and 
gravel trucking but with no apparent grounds for distinguishing between 
that and other types of truck traffic. sa 
From this, the court in Town of Kingston v. Hamilton, concluded 
that regulation of sand and gravel trucks under ch. 40, §21(17) 
would have to be limited to "the objectionable quality of such traffic 
peculiar to earth removal operations," while objections relating 
merely to size, speed, weight and frequency of gravel trucks could 
only be regulated under ch. 40, §22, which specifically provides for 
municipal regulation of traffic. 66 
A final interesting question arises as to whether a municipality 
may require a bond to insure the completion of restoration work on 
mining sites in the absence of statutory authority under either ch. 
40 or ch. 40A. The Hamilton trial court approved such a bond, citing 
a Connecticut case and an A.L.R. Note.67 In a recent case, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts approved a nonstatutory 
bond, recommended by a local health board and incorporated in a 
planning board decision, for the completion of drainage work in a 
subdivision.os 
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VII. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF PRE-EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES 
Control of non-conforming earth-removal operations has been the 
subject of numerous cases and articles.89 The remainder of this arti-
cle will highlight two areas: the scope of use, as defined by a recent 
Massachusetts trial court, and the termination of a non-conforming 
use because of a lapsed permit. 
The Memorandum of Decision, Finding, Rulings and Order for 
Decree issued February 26, 1973, by the trial court in the case of 
Town of Kingston u. Hamilton, discussed above, is a comprehensive 
study of the regulation of prior non-conforming uses under ch. 40 
and ch. 40A. The Memorandum begins with the proposition that 
minimum tolerance is given to non-conforming uses,70 the burden of 
proof being on the landowner to justify continuing use or expansion. 
In reality, however, such a use may not only be continued but may 
increase in volume71 or fiuctuate. 72 The basic test for change of scope 
is found in Town of Bridgewater u. Chuckran: 
(1) whether the use reflects the 'nature and purpose of the use prevailing 
when the zoning by law took effect' .... 
(2) whether there is a difference in the quality or character as well as 
the degree of use . . . 
(3) whether the current use is 'different in kind and in its effect on the 
neighborhood. '73 
Because of the peculiar nature of mining activities, the usual doc-
trine that the physical area of a non-conforming use may not be 
extended could produce what the court in the second case of 
Wayland u. Lee called the "absurd result" that a landowner would 
be limited to the "excavation of pits or holes that have already been 
excavated and now contain nothing but air."74 
To avoid this "absurd result," some courts have adopted a "dim-
inishing assets" theory and have held that all the land may be 
mined up to the boundaries, even though only a portion was touched 
before the effective date of the new local law restricting mining 
activity.75 Conversely, other courts have taken a very narrow view, 
limiting the owner to slight increases in depth and width of the area 
already excavated.76 After discussing the five Massachusetts cases 
involving extent of area, 77 the Hamilton court settled on the doctrine 
of "appropriation to use," holding that a non-conforming use may 
be extended to all areas "devoted to the use by actual occupation 
of the land in a manner physically appropriating it to the use 
.... "7M Appropriation may be accomplished by structures, test 
pits, roads laid out for truck access to all of the property, prepara-
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tion of the ground, or even fencing. However rational this doctrine 
may be with reference to constitutional protection of private prop-
erty rights, if adopted it will inevitably have adverse environmental 
effects. Any sensible sandpit owner, fearing adoption of municipal 
prohibitions on mining, would immediately proceed to devastate his 
entire acreage to assure establishment of appropriation. 
With respect to the second issue, termination of a non-conforming 
use upon lapse of a permit, it is settled law in Massachusetts that 
a revocable permit, or one with a definite termination date, does not 
convey any property rights for which compensation must be paid 
upon termination. A leading case is John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. 
Outdoor Advertising Board. 79 Posting of billboards in Massachu-
setts requires a permit, renewable annually, from the state's Out-
door Advertising Board. After the town of Avon passed a bylaw 
requiring removal of a pre-existing sign, the Board refused to renew 
Donnelly's annual permit, relying on its own regulation providing 
that billboards must be in conformity with local zoning laws. Don-
nelly argued that the billboard, as a pre-existing structure, was a 
non-conforming use protected under the Zoning Enabling Act. The 
court stated that Donnelly took and renewed its permit each year 
"with knowledge that the permit was for a term of one year and was 
revocable by the board for cause."80 The court concluded that 
[where a billboard] is essentially temporary and where, in the absence 
of a required permit, the billboard would constitute a public nuisance, 
we hold that it has not gained the status of a vested right constituting 
a protected nonconforming use under Chapter 40A, §5 as amended.~1 
The "nuisance" analogy is reminiscent of the language of Butler v. 
Town of East Bridgewater, quoted above.82 
Similar results appeared in Mile Road Corp. v. Boston,83 where 
the court held that a private dump could be shut down by statute 
without compensation, despite hardship to the landowner, on the 
grounds that it had been operated by annual revocable permit 
which granted no vested property right immune to prospective gov-
ernmental action. In Liggett Drug Co., Inc. v. Lie. Commissioners 
of City of North Adams, a mandamus petition failed to force re-
newal of restaurant licenses, deemed "mere permissions and in no 
sense property.' '84 
In the light of this doctrine, all Massachusetts earth removal 
permits should be strictly conditioned to lapse at the end of a permit 
period reasonably related to the area being excavated. In this way 
possible status as pre-existing non-conforming uses (should local 
laws be changed) can be limited in advance. 
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CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of local earth removal regulations is firmly 
established in Massachusetts. Properly drafted local ordinances or 
bylaws, whether adopted under chapter 40A or chapter 40, may 
impose stringent permit conditions upon earth removal operations 
in any community. As to existing operations, such regulations will 
operate prospectively. They may restrict dust, noise, vibration, 
erosion, impingement upon waterways and wetlands, and may im-
pose extensive restoration requirements. Regulatory purposes, if 
reasonably related to public health and safety and preservation of 
property values, may be extended to include protection of local land 
and water supply, and to ancillary aesthetic protection. Normally, 
a Massachusetts municipality may adopt an ordinance or bylaw 
forbidding commercial sand and gravel mining. Non-conforming 
operations will be shielded from the effect of the local enactment, 
but this exemption can be limited by a strict construction of appro-
priation to use and by employing local permits with a definite termi-
nation date. Finally, further scientific research into the environ-
mental value of sand and gravel deposits in their native location will 
support more extensive regulation and prohibition of mining activ-
ity in areas important to water supply and water purity. 
-·~-<~t>--·­
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gravel which is the subject of a permit or license issued under the au-
thority of the town or by the appropriate licensing board of such town 
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"No permit ... shall be issued if such removal will: (1) Endanger the 
general public health, safety, or convenience or constitute a nuisance; 
(2) result in detriment to or depreciation of neighboring properties or 
interfere with owners or occupants of neighboring properties in the nor-
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